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THE STRETCHED TANGLE – A METAPHOR FOR CORRUPTION IN HUNGARY and explaining a new approach to curbing corruption through openness, participation and transparency
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Abstract

The integrity approach to curbing corruption led to good results in many countries, like the Netherlands or Australia. The introduction of an adapted version of the Dutch integrity method in Hungary did not prove strong enough to countervail other forces. In the paper I construct an explanation why could this happen and develop a proposal for an alternative methodology.

In the first part of the paper I refer to corruption theories discussed in the key note presentations of the conference and to other theoretical frames to the study of corruption that offer explanation to different aspects of corrupt practices. I also give a short summary of relevant empirical research findings about the actual conditions in Hungary. Based on the description of the situation, I propose a metaphor that captures the gist of the Hungarian corruption phenomenon. The metaphor is a stretched tangle. A knot of multiple interdependent factors. The tangle symbolizes the complexity of the interdependencies. It is stretched because structural arrangements, power structures and networks anchor and sustain deficient practices and produce strong moral and material incentives towards stakeholders to accept the status quo. The role of the metaphor is to divert attention from the explanation of different aspects of corruption and various intervention mechanisms and to focus attention to the complexity and wickedness of the Hungarian problem. This new focus and the corruption concept captured by the metaphor serves as reference for the later discussion of the actual public integrity mechanisms introduced in Hungary and for the explanation of their suboptimal results.

The argument is that the complex challenge betray positivist approach and distinct policy instruments adapted from the Dutch method and introduced with the support of OECD technical assistance programs. In face of complex, wicked problems the solution can only be a transformative process. The focus should shift from individual policy instruments to a post-positivist concept of a transformative process. A process that creates and maintains collective learning and engagement of stakeholders. Only a collectively trusted process of collaborative reframing and organizational learning can create and sustain a "space" where the long process and coordinated action of untangling the stretched tangle is possible.

In the last part of the paper I describe a new method for organizational integrity analysis and development that we elaborated in Hungary. A method that was the result of a shift of focus from positivist policy instruments to a post-positivist approach to transformative change and organizational learning. This new method extends the integrity risk analysis and intervention planning method applied in Hungarian public organizations with a strong collaborative process component. Preliminary results suggest that through the process organizational stakeholders involved gain understanding of the system, build mutual trust and energy for collective action. The collective exploration and learning process may create the engagement and the coordination potential for the long process of dismantling the faulty arrangements and curbing corruption - to untangle the stretched tangle.

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1. Introduction

Before the conference drafts and power point versions of key note presentations were distributed. Two of the key note presentations of the conference discussed the challenge of curbing corruption and strengthening public ethics. Professor de Vries compared the economic, normative-ethical, game-theoretical and the social psychological theoretical frames stressing the importance of the last. Emília Sičáková-Beblavá built her analysis of policy agendas and reforms aimed at improving public ethics in Slovakia on Bazerman's bounded ethicality theory: another frame for socio-psychological inquiry.[2] The two socio-psychological frames directs attention to the interplay of individuals' cognitive and emotional processes and the influences and imperatives of the social and organizational context and explain processes that can lead honest people to act unethically.

At the end of his introductory note Professor de Vries acknowledges that curbing corruption in corruption tolerant and intolerant contexts pose different challenges and proposes that "As corruption can be the result of a variety of causes, we also need a variety of theoretical lenses, pointing to a variety of policies to curb it." (de Vires 2016:2) I fully agree with this proposition, and taking the invitation of Professor de Vries, in the first part of my paper, I bring in additional theoretical lenses that are relevant to the analysis of the corruption problem in the Hungarian public administration, and give a short summary of key findings of recent empirical research. However, as my field is not the analysis of corruption but the building of public integrity, the problematization of corruption for me is only a starting point for the discussion of intervention approaches. Based on the theoretical frames and empirical findings I constructed a metaphor that aims to capture the gist of the problematic in the Hungarian social and organizational environment. The metaphor is a stressed tangle. A knot of multiple interdependent factors. The role of the metaphor is to divert attention from the individual factors, which can be explored with various theoretical frames, to the whole, i.e. to the complex interdependence of the factors. This metaphor proved to have explanatory and communicative power in the community of practice of integrity professionals I work with in Hungary.

In the second part of the paper I use this metaphor to support my argument that one important cause of failures to curb corruption in Hungary and Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) is that anticorruption reforms are focused on technical interventions directed to eliminate individual components of the problem instead of a complex, systemic approach. I will argue that corruption can be curbed only if we can handle the complexity of the phenomenon. For this beyond the applicable good policies and variety of technical instruments, process and system approach is also necessary. I have no intention to deny or down grade the importance of technical expertise in policy making and in the design of anticorruption instruments. I propose that the key questions is not which theoretical lenses or policy tools can bring results. Anticorruption reforms based on any combination of individual positivist technical instruments cannot be successful in corruption tolerant contexts, like the public administration in Hungary. I propose that a positivist approach alone brings weak results. I will argue for the necessity of going beyond positivist[3] technical instruments and the positivist concept of rationalistic planning of reform processes. Instead, I suggest to conceptualize the anticorruption process with a post-positivist approach[4] to transformative change:

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[2] Bounded ethicality refers to the systematic and predictable ways in which humans act unethically beyond their own awareness. (Chugh, Bazerman and Banjali 2005)

[3] The positivist approach is built on the proposition that scientific method means objective, rational analysis that is transcultural and produces results that are independent from the analyst. In public administration the approach is underpinned by the concept of the rational actor, often the selfish agent, and the assumption of regulatory control built on coercive power and rational incentives. In the policy process a key player is the technical expert whose task is to produce objective analysis, predictions, solutions that bring optimal results and schemes for objective measurement. For us relevant resulting methods are: the rationalist planning and the PDCA cycle, and the predict-and-provide, and command-and-control methods.

[4] The post-positivist approach goes beyond logical positivism and technical rationality that have long governed the public administration profession. It proposes that human knowledge does not rest exclusively on unchallengeable foundations but cultural perceptions, and interpretations are also part. Knowledge and truth is a social product, it is the result of community processes. Social reality is socially constructed in communication and actions. Besides the rationalist analysis and planning argumentation and interpretations also play a key role in processes. In political science since the 1990s the argumentative (US), and interpretative (UK) turn has directed attention to discourses, narratives and meanings, to the role of communicative processes in the collective production of reality. In the paper the reference to the post-positivist methods will mostly mean the argumentative method and its underpinning concept of change processes.

where transformative change is a complex learning and engagement building process of stakeholders. [5] (Senge 1999) My proposition is that a post-positivist conceptualization of and strategy for the process can help creating an organizational "space"[6] where stakeholders can face wicked problems. (Senge 2013) In our case stakeholders can collaborate on "untangling" the stretched tangle of the metaphor. When the "space" engenders the positivist technical skills and policy instruments will become effective.

2. Problematizing the public integrity development challenge in Hungary

It is a widely recognized problem in international development that legal instruments adopted by countries through international normative pressure often become distorted during the implementation process to such a degree that they can even become counterproductive. In the anticorruption literature it is also widely discussed how and why adopted legal instruments become "empty shells" and how more regulation can lead to more corruption. (Dimitrova 2010) The same distortive process can also happen in organizations when a new regulatory instrument is perceived as an external intrusion into "internal affairs", or when staff perceives an internal instrument as dictated form above. Experience shows that stakeholders, who lack the commitment to implement the spirit and the word of new regulation, tend to preserve old practices as much as the new rules can be stretched. Research results also suggest that the risks for hollowing out of legal anti-corruption instruments during the implementation process is high when legal change is not adequately supported by a norm socialization process that create acceptance for the new rules and commitment to change old practices. (Moroff- Holger 2010 and Samson 2010)

In order to mitigate this risk it became a key tenet of the integrity approach to anti-corruption that the introduction of new regulatory instruments, has to be coupled with instruments that strengthen the supporting values. The aim is to create a fine balance between the rules, i.e. 'hard instruments', and the 'soft instruments', the norms, that support their implementation. (OECD 2009) The integrity approach led to good results in many countries, like the Netherlands or Australia but in Hungary its introduction did not prove strong enough to countervail other forces. Below I try to construct an explanation why.

The integrity approach arrived to Hungary in 2009 through a technical assistance program supplied by the Dutch Audit office. At the time, the need for effective anticorruption strategy in Hungary was beyond question because twenty years after the political changes and much after the EU accession corruption was still a key and widespread problem. However, conditions, integrity deficits and challenges in the Hungarian public administration were obviously very different than the ones in Netherland whose anti-corruption method was taken over.

According to the categorization developed by Six and Lawton's configurational theory to integrity systems (2013) Hungary is a corruption tolerant, while the Netherland is a corruption intolerant country. This condition makes a huge difference in the necessary problematization of corruption. In a corruption intolerant environment social values and institutional logic work against corruption. Shared values, narratives and institutional logic actively supporting corruption are absent. (Sixt-Lawton 2013: 644) In such corruption intolerant environment the corruption problem can be conceptualized through individual selfish actors' or groups, who find regulatory holes and breach collectively accepted rules for private benefits (Klitgaart 1988), and additionally, through some honest actors who, due to external influences and to their bounded awareness and ethicality, slide into such transactions (Bazerman 2013 and Mazar et al 2008). In such contexts with dominant ethical logic the strategy to curb corruption can be focused on analyzing motives of perpetrators and the gaps in the control system, and strengthening risk containment. Such a strategy can be implemented through distinct interventions, like regulatory changes "fixing incentives" (Klitgaart 1988) and on soft integrity tools guiding their implementation. These are the key components

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[5] By the post positivist concept of the transformative process I mean a complex change process that is different than a technical change process because its aim is not only the ideation and implementations of a rational solution but a complex change process inclusive of the transformation of perceptions, interpretations and relations of involved actors. The solution is, at least partly, the result of the transformation of actors that happens through their communication and interaction. In order to engender a process that can untangle complex, wicked problems leadership is needed that can create a space with committed stakeholders where solutions can be generated and then facilitate the process of change.

[6] With the term „space" I refer to similar processes as to the concept of „presence" introduced by Otto Scharmer and Peter Senge.

of the Dutch integrity method. A package of positivist policy instruments assembled according to a regulatory logic.

Six and Lawton's configurational theory to integrity systems also suggest that integrity development is a different challenge in a corruption-tolerant context, like Hungary. A different a path, i.e. different combination of policies and practices, leads to success. (Six-Lawton 2013: 646) They propose that "in countries that currently have low integrity performance, outside pressure, even when financial and consulting support are provided, to introduce anti-corruption agencies, passing laws and introducing new regulations, may be futile as long as little attention is paid to the institutional logic in the wider society. This is consistent with the argument presented by Persson et al. (2013), who argue that corruption is a collective action problem rather than a principal–agent problem. Furthermore, a focus on compliance-based policies and practices without attention to the degree to which they weaken or strengthen ethical value internalization is likely to be futile is such situations." (Six-Lawton 2013: 655)

According to this theoretical proposition the balanced introduction of the hard (rule/compliance-based), regulatory instruments and the soft, value-building components of the Dutch integrity method would have been absolutely necessary in Hungary. Moreover, the contextualized "healthy balance" could have even meant more and stronger soft (value-based) components. However, the sad reality is that the Dutch integrity approach was only partly adopted in Hungary and with a strong focus on the hard components. The fact that the Hungarian integrity reform has yet failed to bring the expected results in curbing corruption, or make any advance towards stronger public integrity contests the imperfectness of the implemented method.

No systematic analysis is available on how much of this failure can be attributed to the strongly legalistic tradition of the Hungarian public administration (Gellén 2013) and how much to the power of vested interests in preserving corrupt practices and networks. Probably a combination of both. In my argument below I will discuss both.

3. Empirical research findings and personal experiences about the Hungarian context

Findings of researchers exploring the actual corrupt practices in Hungary and post-communist Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) not only support the propositions of the above mentioned collective action problem theory with empirical evidence but add some additional explanatory concepts as well. Jancsics in his recent paper, argues that a web of material and moral imperatives push people into illicit practices. He claims that "informal transactions to exchange organizational resources in the region should not be considered as primarily matter of individual morality or character." (Jancsics 2015: 59) He argues that "such informal behavior is the result of structural arrangements that manifest themselves as imperatives on the individual. … People face strong external imperatives to get involved in everyday informal transactions." (Jancsics 2015: 59) He also attempts to provide an understanding of illicit practices in post-socialist CEE deeper than the over-simplistic "moral inferiority" approach. (Jancsics 2015: 60) According to his explanation roots of actual practices can be traced back to the communist era, to the socialist "get things done" culture and the resulting networks that evolved as the "second economy" in communism to provide solution for everyday problems. (Hankiss 2002 cited in Jancsics 2015) This "tradition" of creating private arrangements as substitutes for public order institutions and effectively functioning formal arrangements has continued after the regime change and today it is not only present as a cultural pattern but it is also embedded into organizational power structures. (Jancsics 2015: 66) Other researchers go one step further: they suggest that network type corruption is not only present but it is growing in actual Hungary. (Szántó et al 2013) Jancsics and Jávor (2012), in their award winning article, have elaborated a detailed analysis of the major network elements and their functions in corrupt transactions.

My personal experiences are very similar to the cases reported in the articles of Jancsics (2015) and Jancsics-Jávor (2012): during public ethics and integrity management trainings civil servant from all areas and levels of the administration equally complain about being ordered to participate in extractive practices and imprisoned in networks and in already normalized illicit organizational practices. The illicitness of part of the practices are obvious for many, creating tremendous personal stress for the honest ones and toxic organizational climates for all. Although, the relevance of the theories referred to in the key note presentations, like bounded ethicality and the maintenance of positive self-concept, is also undeniable in some cases, many other of the reported experiences

do not fit into these socio-psychological theoretical frames. It would be fair to say that the two phenomenon rationalization and emotional resistance/frustration can be both observed, and in combination with the above mentioned collective action problem.

4. A metaphor that captures the problem

In the first two parts I discussed two important sources of corrupt practices that are beyond the concept of selfish personal or group interest advancement and moral deficiency. One source is the normative clash between correct[7] formal regulation and informal culture, the other is the survival and reproduction faulty structural arrangements that stabilize corrupt practices with a web of material and moral incentives. These two factors, as I will discuss later in more detail, considerably enhance the complexity of the challenge in curbing corruption in Hungary compared to the challenge faced in the corruption intolerant Netherland.

Our problem is much deeper and wider than some individual perpetrators who can be identified and sanctioned and a few distinct holes in the regulatory mechanism that can be corrected. A large part of abuses in public service are deeply rooted in a corruption tolerant culture where the avoidance of formal rules is often a collective practice, widely perceived as normal functioning. In this context many anticorruption initiatives can be interpreted as "external" intrusion. An interpretation (labeling) that leads to rationalization of avoiding the effective implementation of anticorruption measures, and with it, solidifying rule avoidance as collective praxis.[8] In this environment many honest people can slide into corrupt practices without realizing. At the same time some corrupt practices, remain beyond the possible rationalization processes of many. As long as these stakeholders who perceive corruptions are isolated in the organizations, they find themselves in a collective action problem. It further complicates the situation that the same person can fall into the first or second group even along issue lines and all these people with all these diverse perceptions and experiences are bound together in a common institutional reality. This is a complex, wicked problem. Like a "stretched tangle" that seems impossible to untangle. (see Figure 1)

Figure 1 – The stretched tangle

INTEGRITY DEFICITS IN A „STRETCHED TANGLE"

For the visualization the art work of Roza el Hassan: Stretched tangle, 1995. was used

CC Katalin Pallai 2015

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[7] as I speak of public integrity by correct regulation I mean rules that comply with the norms of democratic public integrity
[8] Jancsics (2015) explains the phenomenon in details.

The tangle symbolizes the complex interdependence of factors and the resilience of the corruption phenomenon. On the one hand objective factors, like formal rules, structures, incentives, connections, and interactions, and on the other hand personal and collective factors, like perceptions, assumptions, interpretations and informal relations, are entangled in this knot. The problem with this tangle is that its components are densely interconnected. They cannot be untangled one by one. This complex interdependency renders the untangling process extremely difficult. I call it not only a tangle, but a stretched tangle because deeply rooted structural arrangements, power structures and networks anchor and sustain deficient practices and produce moral and material incentives towards stakeholders to accept the status quo. This makes the tangle especially resilient.

The role of the metaphor is to divert attention from the individual factors, which can be explored with various theoretical frames, to the whole, i.e. to the complex interdependence of the factors. This metaphor proved to have explanatory and communicative power in the community of practice of integrity professionals I work with in Hungary. It helped explain why the actually implemented quantitative and mechanistic risk analysis methods can capture only fragments of the problem, and why the distinct technical fixes developed on the basis of such positivist technical analysis cannot curb corruption effectively.

5. The actual, positivist method of risk analysis and intervention planning

The national methodology for organizational corruption and integrity analysis was elaborated by the State Audit Office in 2009. This is a quantitative survey based on a standard compliance risk analysis method, developed on the basis of the method of the Dutch Audit Office. The survey is based on a uniform questionnaire that explores in details risk factors and control mechanisms of public organizations. It is the duty of integrity advisors[9] of the organizations to collect the information, feed it into the questionnaire and send it to the Audit Office. The information is then processed in the Audit Office by an algorithm that creates three measures: one figure for inherent vulnerability, one for factors enhancing corruption vulnerability and one for factors of risk reducing controls. These figures are the basis of macro surveys prepared by the State Audit Office that compare corruption vulnerability of different organizations and trends in changes in risks in specific types of organizations. The survey results are published year by year. (Pulay 2014) Designers of the method had an intention beyond the macro analysis as well. Their idea was that the survey offers a blue print for organizational risk analysis. The data collection obliges organizations to review their own conditions and processes and may call attention to the gaps between vulnerabilities and controls and can guide the process of developing new control mechanism where necessary. This is clearly a positivist regulatory approach to corruption prevention that is focused on the control system. In this process actually the responsibility for the data collection and intervention planning is delegated to the integrity advisor who report results to the head of the organization.[10]

In December 2015 a new methodology for organizational risk analysis was shared on the government's anticorruption website that had been elaborated by the State Audit Office and Ministry of Interior Affairs.[11] This method is a gap analysis similar to the aforementioned one. It surveys individual risk factors and the existence of rules to mitigate them. Where gaps are identified between vulnerability and risk the method suggest to elaborate additional control mechanisms in order mitigate the risk. (State Audit Office-Ministry of Interior 2015) At the same time, this new method is more detailed: it has matrixes not only for the organization as a whole, but for departments and for specific functions as well. This means that the regulatory approach did not change during the years, it only became more detailed. Integrity advisors should go through this mechanistic process that result in more regulation to decrease risks. The question is whether, the more complicated but still mechanistic survey of individual risk factors is better. On the one hand, the question can be raised whether, in view of the above described

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[9] Detailed description of the work of the integrity advisors in Pallai 2015a.
[10] For detailed explanation on the role of the survey see Pulay (2014) and the work of the integrity advisors and Pallai (2015 a).
[11] The status of this method is not clear yet. We will find out later whether it be a suggested or obligatory methodology for integrity advisors.

Hungarian culture of rule avoidance, such a process can really mitigate risks – even in the hand of integrity advisors with highly develop regulatory skills. On the other hand, whether individual regulatory interventions pushed through the system can be effective in face of the wicked problems – whether they can "untangle" the stretched tangle expressed by the metaphor.

At the same time, it is clear that the logic underpinning the actual risk analysis and intervention planning method is the standard rationalistic, positivist policy logic: the integrity advisor, the "wise expert", or a group of experts make an analysis, suggest the best solutions that are legislated and then the organization is expected to operate according to the new rules. This logic raises many question. May this method be effective in the context of already overregulated Hungarian public administration where many illicit practices are stabilized by networks and structural arrangements and the culture of rule avoidance is widespread? Can clear, rational arguments about public purpose supporting regulatory instruments alone deconstruct power structures and networks? Is there a good chance that the individual regulatory instruments identified through the detailed risk analysis matrixes will have power to untangle our stressed tangle? Or is it more plausible that many of the good proposals will be screened out during the policy process? The experience is that the first screen for rational policy ideas is in the expert: in the learned helplessness and personal loyalties of the experts. Often they do not see or do not imagine plausible some of the necessary interventions. The second filter is the decision making process: few decision makers are prepared to dismantle the structures where they are involved in and that has put them in their advantageous positions. Even if two "local heroes", a committed expert and a decision maker, both free from bounded rationality and ethicality, met in one organization and decided to implement the "magic rational instrument" that could make real changes, could they effectively push through the instrument without major distortions in the context of the "stretched tangle"?

At this point it is important to note that the original Dutch organizational integrity development method is different than the Hungarian adaptation. It is equally based on a gap analysis method but in the Netherlands the analysis is a process executed by integrity working groups assembled from staff members from various organizational units. Staff collaborate in a coordinated self- and peer-analysis process that involves mutual learning, in internal transparency and leads to wide support for the resulting report. I find it symptomatic to the Hungarian context that during the adaptation this collaborative process component "somehow" disappeared both from the methodology and the practice. This is a grave problem because the collaborative analysis process produces the organizational learning: the sharing of information, the complex mapping and analysis of problems, the system understanding of the stakeholders and the organizational and personal relations that make effective and coordinated interventions possible. This organizational learning process that is transparent and accessible for internal stakeholders would be utmost important in the corruption tolerant context of the Hungarian public organizations as well. Only the collective process could solve the collective action problem that cannot be solved by the above mentioned lonely "local heroes" alone. However, if local initiators could create a process where many are involved and become engaged, the forces of the "learning organization" could be the engine for reform. (Senge 1999)

The problem is that the actual condition of the Hungarian public administration units is so far from the culture of learning organizations that this a paradigm shift seems nearly impossible to achieve. Nevertheless some of our results give hope.

6. Our experience in transmitting "post-positivist experiences"

The first step to elaborating our own method and assessing the possibilities to achieving changes with dialogic problem solving processes with Hungarian civil servants was the positive experience of a large Public ethics and integrity management training program implemented in 2013. We delivered the trainings for some ten thousand civil servants by the same methodology. The objectives of the trainings were to (1) encourage participants to reflect on the integrity-deficient organizational practices in order to collectively reframe them (2) break their apathy and learned helplessness towards positive action and strengthen their trust in possible change, and (3) help them see the operation of their organizations and the wicked corruption problems as systems and find their potential role in anticorruption, i.e. lead them to take responsibility. For all these objectives we had to show that criminalization of

corruption alone is not enough, i.e. the full responsibility cannot be shifted to the legal system. Additionally, we had to show the role of a well-organized and functioning public administration in curbing corruption, and with this encourage participants to understand their own potential role in fighting corruption and to take responsibility. The teaching method best suited for this purpose was a participant-centred interactive, experiential method with a strong argumentative component based on facilitated peer learning. (Pallai 2014b: 142-146. Pallai: 2015: 96) A post-positivist approach to transformative education.

During the trainings we attempted to offer not only personal experiences about the power of reframing problems and the transformative power of dialogic processes, but we discussed cases from home and abroad where transformative leadership played a key role in changing corrupt organizational operation to high level of integrity.

We surveyed effectiveness of the trainings through questionnaires filled up by 6,692 participants of single day trainings and the 670 participants of the three-day courses.[12] Participants completed a questionnaire prior to the training session and immediately after it. Respondents were told to choose and write the same pseudonym for both questionnaires. This technique ensured the possibility of matching precisely the pre and post surveys and tracking the change of responses, even at the individual level, for each item.

For our survey we included 8 questions regarding corruption and anticorruption in a longer list of questions. In both (pre- and post-training) questionnaires these 8 questions were identical in wording. 4 questions aimed to survey changes in attitudes: they revolved around apathy, helplessness, and trust. The other 4 were knowledge questions that determined whether participants understood better that not only legal instruments, but transparency, organization, and effectiveness are also key instruments in fighting corruption. Results confirmed that in both training designs, changes of average agreement along each item was statistically significant. We could produce results even with the shorter versions of the trainings. (see: figure 2)

Figure 2 – Effectiveness survey results of one day training sessions (source: Pallai-Gregor 2015)

Although the surveys had proved that the trainings implemented in 2013 had been successful, the question was open whether the insights and energy generated during the trainings would be exploited in the organizations.

Six months after the training sessions we conducted interviews with former participants in high positions to explore longer term impacts. (Siklaki 2015) The result of this qualitative survey confirmed that key attitude and knowledge components had lasting impacts and the cases carrying the essential messages about transformative change processes could be recalled. There was however one unexpected element: the strongest experience for many in high leadership position was to be part of an interdependent group involved in constructive "learning" dialogue. After six months the more committed leaders were still reflecting on how they could implement similar processes in their own organizational environments. (Siklaki 2015) This was good news because it showed that the experience opened some leaders' attention to collaborative organizational processes but it also showed that method and process support was yet missing. In principle, in the Hungarian public administration integrity advisors could take the role of initiating collaborative integrity survey and reform processes, however, as we discussed above the actual integrity method they were expected to implement was not developed for this purpose.

In 2014 I had the opportunity to revise the post-graduate education program of integrity advisors. The old curriculum was a typical academic program teaching legal and management theories in the form of frontal education. The aim of the revision was to offer integrity advisors both technical expertise in corruption risk containment and commitment, competence and methods for leading organizational processes of transformation. (Pallai 2014a) The strategy of the curriculum is to start the post-graduate education of integrity advisors with a process of personal competence building that is itself a transformative process. The process gives students an experience of transformation within the group: the transformation of perceptions, knowledge and relations, and the resulting coproduction of ideas and learning. This experience builds up a learning environment where the technical subject can also be mastered through engaged dialogue. (Pallai 2015a) This experience opens new doors for the participants. Already after the first semester, some start to experiment with dialogic methods for solving complex problems in their own organizations. Our hope was since the beginning that many of the integrity advisers graduating from the new program will be able to support organizational leaders open to collaborative processes to initiate processes where substantial advances happen in integrity development through organizational learning processes.

The third contributing factor to the development of the new methodology was that the formation of community of practice was initiated in 2014 during the operation of the Center for Excellence for Integrity at the National University for Public Service that survived in the form of faculty workshops for the development of the post-graduate integrity advisor curriculum. Faculty was composed by active integrity advisors, academics and professionals in expertise in designing and leading organizational development and change processes. During the one to three day long faculty workshops faculty a creative professional dialogue evolved for creating an integrated integrity method adapted for the actual condition of the Hungarian public administration. The most important innovations grew at the border of different fields of expertise: form the deep collaboration of technical and process experts. (Pallai 2015a) The new integrity development method that we work on actually, and I will shortly present in the next part, is one of the fruits of this collaboration between technical experts of risk analysis and experts on collaborative process management. (Pallai 2015b)

7. The new method we work on

The new method we trust is built both on the relevant experience from the internal integrity working group of the Dutch method and the positive reactions and results to the dialogic method applied through the Public ethics and integrity management trainings and during the post-graduate education of integrity advisors. What we suggest as a new method is a structured collective process of organizational mapping of weaknesses and risks, a systematic exploration of the interdependencies and design and prioritization of interventions.

The process is structured in two ways: one is the structuring of the process of inquiry, the other is the structuring of the involvement of stakeholders. The innovation in the structure of the inquiry is that instead of following lists

and blue prints like in the previous methods, internal stakeholders are led through the exploration and mapping process constantly focusing on three interrelated components of the integrity system: the organizational rules (control and compliance system), the organizational ethics and culture and the personal and organizational competences. This structure of analysis sharpens participants' system awareness: a key capacity for untangling the complex problems.

The exploration happens through a facilitated dialogic process where sharing and exchanging hard information and the sharing personal and local knowledge and perceptions are equally possible. This allows stakeholders to develop the necessary insight, and shared understanding on the one hand, and the trust and engagement on the other hand that gives chance to untangle the stressed tangle of the metaphor mentioned above. Through the dialogue and formal analysis not only the deconstructing but the reconstructing of various interdependencies can also happen. The result of the dialogic process is that shared aspirations, a shared understanding of necessary interventions and a "shared memory of the future" can evolve that will be crucial during the implementation of the agreed interventions. The expectation is that during the process stakeholders' attitude changes, in similar manner as in during the training and post-graduate education groups, from the apathetic, corruption tolerant pattern to a responsible ethical stance and that, at the same time, the openness[13] of the process solidifies its results and makes the political cost of refusing its results very high. The evolving mutual trust among stakeholders built during the process and the evolving connectedness in thinking contributes to the weight of the process.

For the effectiveness of the method the structuring of stakeholder involvement is equally important. Nevertheless, its discussion is not included because it is more a technical question, would overstretch the limits of this paper while it is less connected to the main argument here. The focus here was on the characteristics of a post-positivist concept of a transformative process that is is proposed in the paper as a response for the wicked corruption problem symbolized by the metaphor of the stretched tangle.

As a closing information it must be stated that the method is not yet introduced fully in any organization. There are only cases where some steps have started. Consequently, I cannot prove the effectiveness of this method, like the effectiveness of the training method. I can only share the reactions of active integrity advisors whom we led through the method, as kind of peer reviewers, at the end of the post-graduate program. They shared their experience in statements like, "the method of collaborative analysis has brought in many angles and made me realize many important aspects that were new for me"[14.], or "during the process the connections established among the components revealed possibilities for better interventions"[15], and finally a method "that renders integrity development in our context accomplishable"[16].

8. Conclusions

In my paper I proposed that in our corruption tolerant context integrity development within public organizations is a transformative challenge: both the structural arrangements and the prevailing organizational culture need to be changed. The process needs to be systemic and collective. It can happen neither on the basis of individual technical fixes, nor through individual initiatives, either from above or below. In the case of a dysfunction embedded in structures and norms, when a technical fix is implemented without changing the structures and norms where they are embedded, the risk of abuse is high. If individuals led by personal integrity break widely accepted practices, they take disproportionate personal risk and have little chance to succeed. This is a very different context than the corruption intolerant Dutch context where the Hungarian integrity mechanisms were adopted from. My proposition in the paper was that a key source of the weakness of results of the integrity approach in Hungary is

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[13] i.e. transparency within the organization

[14] feedback regarding the method from student in leadership position in a large unit of public administration

[15] feedback of student who already works as integrity advisor in his organization

[16] participating faculty contribution during a faculty workshop

that the difference in the implementation context was not adequately dealt with during the adaptation of the Dutch method.

If we accept the stretched tangle metaphor integrity reform can only happen through a systemic and collectively trusted processes. Only a cooperative process that involve a wide range of stakeholders can build the necessary insight, trust and engagement that gives chance to untangle the stressed tangle. A process that change stakeholders' attitude and behavior from the apathetic, corruption tolerant pattern to a responsible ethical stance and that, at the same time, builds mutual trust among the stakeholders so as all feel ensured that will not act alone and trust the connectedness in thinking and action. For this, beside the positivist instruments of the Dutch method, coordinative communicative processes are also necessary that can prepare stakeholders and the ground for collective action through altering shared assumptions, interpretations and expectations. (Schmidt 2015: 100) Beside the positivist tools a post-positivist dialogic strategy is also necessary for creating the "space" for the long transformative process that can gradually dismantle those structural and personal arrangements that support the corrupt, extractive practices.

My claim about the need for the transformative space where change evolves in consequence of change in attitudes, sense making, behavior and relations of stakeholders, does not imply any kind of neglect of positivist analysis and policy tools. Technical tools and mastery of them remain crucial. What I suggest is that, in a corruption tolerant culture, for the effectiveness of the positivist anticorruption instruments a post-positivist strategy is also necessary. A strategy that changes institutional reality, builds mutual trust among stakeholders, breaks learned helplessness, initiates involvement and action, and with it creates the space and coordination for the effective application of the policy instruments. Untangling the, sometimes petrified, arrangements is a long "journey". Time, system thinking, engagement and collaboration of stakeholders across boundaries and a processual approach are necessary. An approach that is different not only from regulatory logic but also from the rationalist planning paradigm of the positivist schools. (van der Heijden 2005: xvi)

The positivist components of such transformative processes are well known and familiar for civil servants in Hungary and in the Central European region, but leadership of transformative processes is very rarely part either the education or the practice of our civil servants yet. The focal question in my public integrity work in Hungary has ever been how the norm building component can be developed in our context. How the excellent technical experts, schooled exclusively in positivist methods can extend their understanding to system thinking, norm building and process management, and how can new methodologies for public integrity development be envisioned through the cooperation of many different professionals who can bring in all necessary competences. This paper allowed only to sketch the conceptual frame but allowed not to go into details. Concrete experiences produced during the last years in this direction are reported in details in my other papers (Pallai 2015a. and b. and Pallai-Gregor 2015)

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